As Turkey emerges from its current political crisis, democratically strengthened and most likely with a dynamic new president in Abdullah Gul, one rapid consequence will be to put the European Union's foreign policy on the spot. Will the Union move rapidly to back Turkey's democratic modernization or will it continue to squander its political capital in internal disputes over how to deal with Turkey?

It used to be said that EU enlargement was Europe's most successful foreign policy, giving it considerable political and economic leverage over candidate countries in its region. But in the case of Turkey, this risks being one of the Union's clumsiest and potentially most damaging foreign policy failures.

Almost as soon as the EU agreed to open membership negotiations with Turkey just under three years ago, things turned sour on both sides. The Union, bogged down in its own constitutional crisis, had a fit of enlargement fatigue, with a gaggle of politicians - not least from France and Austria - rushing to declare that Turkey could never join the EU, no matter what the EU's leaders had just unanimously agreed.

Turkey, whose rapid democratic, human rights and economic reforms under Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan had opened the door to talks at the start of 2005, did not help to keep tempers cool. Soon the European Union and Turkey were clashing over the divided island of Cyprus, which had joined the EU in 2004 despite the absence of a peace deal.

At the same time, Turkish political reforms slowed, violence returned to Turkey's Kurdish south-east, and dozens of writers and journalists were prosecuted under the notorious Article 301 of the Turkish penal code, which forbids "insulting Turkishness," culminating at the start of this year in the murder of the Turkish-Armenian journalist Hrant Dink. By the time Turkey's generals issued their ultimatum at the end of April implicitly opposing Gul's presidential candidacy, both EU and Turkish nationalists were rubbing their hands in glee at Turkey's spoiling of its own chances of ever signing up to the EU club.

Except that Turkey hasn't spoiled its chances. In July, the country's political parties took part in a robust democratic electoral campaign. Turnout was high. And Turkish voters showed what they thought of the military's clumsy intervention in politics by returning Erdogan's Justice and Development Party with an increased majority with 46 percent of the vote.

Even before putting his cabinet in place, Erdogan announced that his advisers are working on a new civilian constitution to replace the military-inspired one of 1981. This bold move suggests that a confident, strong new government will now move fast on political reforms. A replacement for Article 301 can be anticipated. So can a less-hawkish stance on the south-east and any incursion into northern Iraq, supposedly much favored by Turkey's generals.

Meanwhile, the economy is booming. Where then is the European Union? Unfortunately, there is little sign of it gearing up its foreign policy to support democratic modernization of this key geostrategic neighbor and NATO ally. The new president on the block, Nicolas Sarkozy, made clear before and after his election his visceral opposition to allowing Turkey into Europe. And at the end of June, France blocked the opening of membership talks with Turkey on the euro - notionally on "technical" grounds but essentially because Sarkozy wants Turkey to have nothing more than a "privileged partnership" with Europe, never to be a full member of the club. Other member states shuffled their feet and talked nervously in response, but did nothing. This autumn, the European Commission is expected to issue a fairly critical annual progress report on Turkey, given Turkey's reform standstill in the last year. But it is for Europe's leaders, not its bureaucrats to rise to the moment, and respond to the new positive political situation in Turkey. Europe's position should be clear: If Islam and democracy can go hand in hand, then so can Islam and Europe through Turkey's bid to join the club.

But the EU is in a mess - there is no chance of it making a robust restatement of Europe's commitment to Turkey's membership. France is now publicly opposed. And Germany's leader, Angela Merkel, though standing by her coalition policy of support for Turkey, is known to prefer a privileged partnership.

Meanwhile, the Greek Cypriots, stalling on any deal to reunite their island, search for any means to take their specific dispute with Turkey into the wider EU negotiations. Many in the Union, both for and against enlargement, will admit off the record, that bringing a divided Cyprus into the EU was a mistake. But error or not, eight areas of negotiations with Turkey are currently suspended, due to Turkey's refusal to even allow Greek Cypriot vessels into its ports. And EU membership has made the chances of a Cypriot peace settlement much less likely, a serious foreign policy failure both in itself and for Europe's future relations with Turkey.

Turkey does have some European supporters, not least the United Kingdom. But Britain is increasingly seen as a semi-detached member of the Union, having won a new raft of opt- outs from EU policies at the June summit meeting. And while its new prime minister, Gordon Brown, talks of an outward-looking EU, that means climate change and globalization more than clever diplomacy on Turkey.

Spain has been positive. And Italy sees the foreign policy advantages of bringing Turkey in, but its federalist prime minister, Romano Prodi, is wary of anything that could weaken the drive towards a more political Europe. Other member states, from Belgium to Slovakia, are less than enthusiastic.

Greece has been an important supporter til now of Turkey's membership bid, but some Greek voices can be heard wondering what they get from this policy and whether Sarkozy's idea of a privileged partnership might not be enough after all.

It's an EU muddle, but one with global ramifications. The Union has a choice. It can restate its high-level foreign policy commitment to the membership talks with Turkey, backed by all its leaders. Or it can continue its loud internal debate on whether its decision to open talks with Turkey should be lived up to, while France, Cyprus and others continue to undermine the talks, souring the atmosphere in Turkey. The former looks unlikely. But if it is the latter, not only will Europe be seen to have failed in its biggest foreign policy challenge in the region, it will also carry little clout or conviction anywhere else it intervenes.

Kirsty Hughes is a former senior fellow of the Center for European Policy Studies in Brussels.

By Kirsty Hughes August 23, 2007

Kaynak: TUSIAD
Turkish Industrialists' & Business Association
Representative to the EU and BUSINESSEUROPE
(The Confederation of European Business)